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We examine the relative efficiency performance of the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the first 
stand-alone full-fledged Islamic commercial bank in the Western world, against conventional 
banks in the UK, and also against Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries. We also apply a 
two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model to determine the impact of internal and 
external factors on bank's efficiency.  In order to investigate the association of the DEA-efficiency 
scores with the traditional accounting ratios, we estimate the correlation coefficients between the 
two variables. The efficiency-profitability matrix is used to enable the characterization of the 
banks' performance profile. Our analysis covers the period from 2005 to 2008. 
 
Our results show that the IBB is technically inefficient. It also has relatively a poor financial 
performance.  The bank‘s inefficiency stems from both scale (size) and management issues.  IBB 
exhibits, however, an upward trend in efficiency and profitability, particularly in adverse market 
conditions. Thus, it has a great prospect to increase efficiency and strong potential for further 
growth in the UK. Additionally, results suggest that the technically more efficient banks are 
larger, have greater profitability and loans intensity, acquire less debt, and on average have a 
lower market share.  IBB is relatively superior in terms of lending intensity and capital adequacy.  
Findings further illustrate that the DEA measures can be used separately or concurrently with 
standard accounting measures in determining Islamic banks performance.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
anking is considered as one of the major components of a financial system, since it has a broad impact 
on the overall financial stability and strength of an economy. It connects economic units and 
participants in the creation of financial markets. Banking plays a major role of financial intermediation 
and helps in creation of wealth through the establishment of a series of economic relations. Interest is considered the 
fundamental source of revenue for banks. As a result, the financial markets and institutions are highly sensitive to 
changes in interest rates due to their critical role in generating revenues and profits. Any change in the interest rate 
has an impact on the banking and financial sector. Therefore, the banks are actively engaged in interest rate risk 
management. 
 
Islamic banking differs from conventional banking in several important ways. The essential feature of 
Islamic banking is that it is interest-free. Shari‘ah-compliant financial institutions do not deal with interest.1 In 
Islam, interest is considered as a form of exploitation because it is merely a charge on use of money. Consequently, 
Islamic banking has its own set of unique risks and challenges. This, however, calls for the development of modern 
mechanisms to allow interest income to be replaced with cash flows from productive sources, such as returns from 
                                                 
1  The prohibition of usury (interest) is not specific to Muslims rather its roots are in Christianity and Judaism. 
B 
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wealth generating investment activities and operations, which include for example, profits from trading in (real) 
assets and cash flows from the transfer of usufruct (the right to use an asset). Modern Islamic financing techniques 
were developed first in Muslim countries of Asia, notably Malaysia. Since the mid-1990s, the boom in the Islamic 
banking industry and in the widely acceptable and reliable techniques has risen significantly in the Gulf region 
mainly due to the sudden increase in oil revenues. 
 
Nowadays, Islamic finance is emerging as an alternative to the conventional banks in many parts of the 
world.
 
Islamic finance is also attracting conventional investors seeking to get evolved into new investment 
opportunities. For instance, HSBC Amanah, the segregated division of HSBC, provides a range of Shari‘ah 
compliant financial services such as the Amanah bank account and Amanah home services to meet the needs of the 
UK Muslim community. Barclays Capital, the investment banking arm of Barclays bank plc, is considered as a 
market-leading franchise in the Islamic bonds "Sukuk" market. Ahli United Bank (UK) introduced Manzil "the home 
purchase plans" to help clients purchase residential property in accordance with their religious regulations. Al Buraq 
- The Arab Banking Corporation (ABC), through its London subsidiary ABC International Bank plc (ABCIB), 
brings 'alburaq' to offer Shari‘ah-compliant home financing for residential (mortgage) properties in the UK. The Citi 
Islamic Investment Bank E. C. (“CIIB”), the fully owned subsidiary of Citicorp Banking Corporation, has been 
continuingly playing a pioneering and innovative role in the industry through Islamic finance windows within Citi. 
Lloyds TSB have developed a suite of Shari‘ah approved products. Last but not least, the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS)-Islamic banking provides customers with consumer and commercial products based on diminishing 




Given the differential behavior of the Islamic banks and the conventional banks, there has always been 
question about the long run sustainability of Islamic banks which in turn depends heavily on their efficiency 
performance. The efficiency of conventional banks has been widely studied in the literature to assess the experience 
of banks in achieving their objectives. Efficiency is defined as a performance measure indicating how prudently a 
bank is utilizing its resources in producing outputs. It implies improved profitability, better prices and service 
quality for consumers, and greater amounts of funds intermediated (Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey, 1993). 
Determining banking efficiency would enable bank’s management to identify areas of efficiency and/or inefficiency 
in comparison to their competitors. Such recognition indeed helps the banks’ management to improve its 
performance and market position. Efficiency estimate captures also the effects of deregulation and financial 
disruption, institutional failure, problem loans, management quality, market concentration, and the mergers and 
acquisitions. Thus, the enhanced efficiency in banks contributes to a healthier economy. This is because the banking 
sector output is highly correlated with economic growth (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
In practice, to measure banks efficiency, different approaches are applied, either to banks within the 
financial sector (inter-banking comparison) or to branches within a bank (intra-bank comparison). By and large, 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the widely used efficiency analysis method. The literature on the application 
of DEA frontier analysis comprises a massive amount of empirical researches, such as Casu and Molyneux (2003). 
 
From an “academic” point of view, despite the considerable development of Islamic banking sector, there 
are still few studies which explore the efficiency of Islamic banks. Previous studies focused primarily on the 
conceptual issues of Islamic banking. The main purpose of this paper is primarily to bridge this gap in the literature. 
Our primary contribution to the literature is our undertaking of the first empirical analysis of the relative efficiency 
performance of IBB, which is considered as the first stand-alone Islamic commercial bank in the Western world. We 
basically attempt to answer the following two fundamental questions that arise after reviewing a brief literature on 
the Islamic banking and efficiency measurement techniques: Does IBB produce superior efficiency compared to the 
counterparties-conventional banks in the UK? Does IBB tend to outperform Islamic banks in Muslims countries? 
 
                                                 
2  In diminishing Musharaka (co-ownership), the financier and the client participate either in joint ownership of a property, or in a 
joint commercial enterprise. The share of the financier is divided into a number of units. The client purchases these units based 
on a redeeming mechanism until he is the sole owner of the property. On the other hand, Murabaha contract (cost-plus financing) 
is frequently appears as a form of trade finance based upon letters of credit. This contract involves the sale of an item on a 
deferred basis. The item is delivered immediately and the price to be paid for the item includes a mutually agreed margin of profit 
payable to the seller.  
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To answer the former questions, we provide evidence on the performance of the Islamic Bank of Britain 
(IBB) over the period 2005-2008. This is based on the overall technical efficiency measurement, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), which also examines the bank‘s pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). In order 
to specify input-output variables, the output oriented-intermediation approach is selected. Furthermore, the DEA 
efficiency scores obtained from the first-stage are used as dependent variables in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model to investigate the effect of multiple factors on banks’ performance.  Eventually, to further illustrate 
the relationship between efficiency and profitability we examine, on one hand, the correlation between the DEA 
scores and the main accounting measurements, ROA and ROE. On the other hand, we measure the efficiency – 
profitability matrix which has similarity in structure to the product portfolio matrix approach. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related studies in the literature. 
Section 3 discusses the methodology and choice of input and output variables for the efficiency model. Section 4 
reports the empirical findings. Finally, section 5 presents the overall concluding remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
There is a large body of descriptive literature that offers comparisons of the instruments used in Islamic 
banking versus conventional banking. It also discusses the legal principles and regulatory challenges related to 
Islamic banking such as: Jobst (2007), Sundararajan and Errico (2002), and Sole (2007). Existing empirical 
literature on Islamic banking focuses primarily in assessing the performance of Islamic banks based on financial 
ratios. For example, Metwally (1997) tests the primary differences among Islamic and conventional banks in terms 
of liquidity, leverage, credit risk, profitability and efficiency for 30 banks over the period 1992-1994. The statistical 
evidence suggests that the two groups of banks may be differentiated in terms of liquidity, leverage and credit risk, 
but not in terms of proﬁtability and efﬁciency. Similarly, Samad and Hassan (1999) evaluate the inter-temporal and 
the inter-bank performance of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) in terms of profitability, liquidity, risk and 
solvency, and community involvement for the period 1984-1997. They compare BIMB against 8 conventional banks 
using the financial ratios. The study finds that BIMB is relatively more liquid, less risky but has low average profit 
compared to conventional banks. 
 
Rosly and Bakar (2003) evaluate the relative financial performance of the Islamic banking scheme (IBS) 
banks against the mainstream banks in Malaysia for the period 1996-1999. The study argues that the IBS higher 
recorded (ROA) is not due to efficient investment policy but, rather it is caused by technical default. It concludes 
that the mainstream banks perform better than Islamic banks due to larger market size and greater experience. 
Additionally, Samad (2004) examines the comparative performance of six Islamic banks in Bahrain against fifteen  
interest-based conventional commercial banks with respect to profitability, liquidity risk, and credit risk for a period 
from 1991-2001. The results indicate that there are no major differences in profitability and liquidity between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. In terms of volume (average dollar business), the performance of Islamic 
banks is far below the conventional banks in Bahrain. Islamic banks, as newcomers to the financial market, are 
however performing as well as the conventional banks in a similar age group. In addition, Islamic banks are exposed 
to less credit risk compared to conventional banks. Interestingly, their credit performance is superior to that of 
conventional banks. 
 
Based on cross-country analysis, Čihák and Hesse (2008) present for the first time a comparative empirical 
analysis of Islamic banks’ with respect to financial stability. The sample covers individual Islamic and conventional 
banks in 20 banking systems (i.e. Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank 
and Gaza, and Yemen) over the period 1993 to 2004. They find out that small Islamic banks tend to be financially 
stronger than small conventional banks. On the other hand, large conventional banks tend to be financially stronger 
than large Islamic banks. Meanwhile, small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks 
which may reflect challenges of credit risk management in large Islamic banks. 
 
Despite of the extensive conceptual academic works on Islamic banking and finance, and the use of 
straightforward financial ratio analysis for understanding and predicting the performance of Islamic banks, there  are 
few studies being attempted to empirically measure the efficiency performance of Islamic banks either in Muslim‘s 
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countries or in Europe. The lack of coherent evidence regarding the efficiency of Islamic banks is likely to be a 
consequence of the industry small size and newness. 
 
Among those who investigate empirically the efficiency of Islamic banks is Yudistira (2004).
 
He provides 
new evidence on the performance of 18 Islamic banks in GCC-States, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Cambia, Sudan, 
Egypt and Jordan, over the period 1997-2000. The research work is based on efficiency measurement in which Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is utilized to analyze the technical efficiency (TE) and scale efficiency (SE) of 
Islamic banks. Findings indicate that the inefficiency across Islamic banks is, by and large, small at just over 10%, 
which is quite low compared with many conventional counterparts. Islamic banks suﬀer slight ineﬃciencies during 
the global crisis of 1998-9, but performed very well after the difficult periods. Results also suggest that there are 
diseconomies of scale for small-to-medium Islamic banks which suggests that mergers should be encouraged. 
 
In 2001, Limam uses a stochastic frontier model to examine the technical efficiency of banks in Kuwait 
from 1994 to 1999. He reports that most banks in his sample are scale efficient therefore, increasing bank size 
through mergers and acquisition does not substantially enhance technical efficiency of the merged banks. Limam 
provides evidence to suggest that the larger bank size, higher share of equity capital in assets and greater 
profitability are associated with better efficiency. 
 
Most recently, Kamaruddin, Safa, and Mohd (2008) apply DEA technique to present new perspectives on 
performance of Islamic banking operations in Malaysia during the period 1998-2004. They investigate for the first 
time both cost and profit efficiency of full-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic windows operations of domestics and 
foreign banks. They find that Islamic banking operators are relatively more efficient at controlling costs than at 
generating profits. This means, cost efficiency comes from resource management and economies of scale, 
respectively. 
 
Overall, there is lack of evidence regarding the efficiency performance of Islamic commercial banks 
operating in the European financial system. This paper intends primarily to put that evidence into practice using the 




Several approaches have been developed for measuring banks' level of efficiency
3 
, ranging from simple 
financial ratios to complex econometric models. Complex efficiency estimation techniques can be categorized into 
parametric and non-parametric methods (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). There is no consensus in the literature as to 
which approach is better as both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. They differ primarily with respect 
to the assumptions imposed on data. The parametric approaches require assumptions about the particular form of 
cost or profit function and the distribution of efficiency (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The non-parametric 
approaches, on the other hand, require no such specification of the functional form. The most commonly used 
approaches among non-parametric methods are the DEA and the Free Disposable Hull (FDH). While the most 
widely used parametric methods are the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) 
and the Distribution Free Approach (DFA). The next sections (3.1 - 3.4) consider the application of the efficiency 
measurement of the DEA approach. 
 
3.1.     Technical efficiency measurement using DEA-approach 
 
DEA is a non-parametric approach that is considered as an alternative method to estimate productive 
efficiency
 
in the financial sector.
4
 DEA approach shows how a particular bank operates relative to other banks in the 
                                                 
3  The modern efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957). He proposed that the efficiency of a firm consists of two 
components: technical efficiency (TE), which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs, 
and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to use inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. 
The two measures are then combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency (Coelli, 1996).  
4  The concept of production efficiency originated from Cobb and Douglas (1928). The study is premised on the structural 
relation between inputs and outputs in economic production. Berger and Humphrey (1997) extended the Cobb-Douglas model to 
the banking sector by focusing mainly on financial sector efficiency. 
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same sample. It provides a benchmark for best practice technology based on the experience of those banks in the 
sample. The DEA estimates are based on technological efficiency where efficient firms are those for which no other 
firm (or linear combination of firms) produces as much or more of output provided given inputs, or uses as little or 
less input produce a given output. The efficient frontier is composed of these un-dominated firms and the piecewise 
linear segment that connect the set of input/output combinations of these firms yielding a convex production 
possibility set (Bauer, Berger, Ferrier, and Humphrey, 1998). 
 
One of the DEA advantages particularly relevant to our study is that it works well with small samples 
requiring the smallest number of observations. Another advantage of the DEA is that it enables analysts to identify 
the sources of inefficiency not apparent from financial results. For instance, studies of benchmarking practices 
utilizing DEA identify numerous sources of inefficiency in some of the most profitable banks. This is because of the 
high-profit bank may be quite inefficient in processing transactions, which may not be apparent from financial 
measures (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2007). 
 
DEA method does not impose any assumption on the structural form of banks as it requires no pre-
specified functional form. Rather, the functional form is generated from the sample of the evaluated firms; hence, it 
reduces the probability of an incorrect functional model (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). DEA can estimate technical 
efficiency
 5
 under the assumption of Constant-Returns-to-Scale (CRS) and Variable-Returns-to-Scale (VRS). The 
CRS assumption is only appropriate
 
when all Decision Making Units (DMUs) are operating at optimal scale. Factors 
like imperfect competition and constraints in finance may cause our sample banks not to operate well at their 
optimal scale of operations. 
 
On the basis of the prior arguments, this paper compares Islamic banks to counterparties-conventional 
banks using DEA approach. In order to account for the fact that the sizes of the banks in our sample vary greatly, 
ranging from large active banks to small banks, we estimate our DEA-model under the assumption of VRS approach 
as suggested by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) and Cooper et al. (2007), also known as (BCC-model). 
 
The DEA approach measures efficiency based on either an input-oriented model (i.e. input/output) or an 
output- oriented model (i.e. output/input). In the former model, the DEA aims to identify technical inefficiency as a 
proportional reduction in input usage, meanwhile in the later output-oriented model; technical inefficiency is 
measured as a proportional increase in output production. To date, the literature is uncertain as to the best choice 
between the two orientation models. The choice of orientation will not have a major impact on efficiency 
estimations since both approaches will construct the same frontier, and thus the same efficient DMUs (best 
performers) would be identified. However, inefficient DMUs ranking would possibly change (Coelli, 1996). In this 
research, we assume an output- oriented approach where the technical inefficiency is measured as a proportional 
increase in output production. Our preference for this measure is due to its reliability and a better fit to our situation. 
Islamic banks operating under competitive environment hence, strive to offer the best possible products for their 
clients. Therefore, they are more likely to solidify their competitive advantage by increasing outputs production 
rather than reducing the input usage. 
 
3.2. Data and variables  
 
Our methodology differs from literature research papers in various aspects. With respect to sample, unlike 
other studies, we employ 40 banks. The distribution of banks is illustrated in Table 1 below.
6
 Moreover, we 
examine, for the first time, the relative efficiency of the first and the only fully-fledged Islamic commercial bank in 
the UK i.e. (the IBB), against counterparties-conventional commercial banks in the UK and also against Islamic 
banks from Turkey, GCC-States and Malaysia. Furthermore, the study time span 2005-2008 helps to account for the 
impact of the recent financial crisis on the efficiency of the selected banks. 
                                                 
5  The term overall (total), or also called "Technical Efficiency (TE)", is taken from the literature of economics where it is used to 
distinguish the "technological" aspects of production from other aspects. TE = [Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE)]*[Scale 
Efficiency (SE)] (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2006). 
6 Our sample is larger than 30 banks. This makes it appropriate and compatible with previous researches. The advantage of a 
sample size ≥30 is the applicability of the central limit theorem. The population size of our study is, however, quite similar to 
other studies employ the DEA technique, such as Darrat, Topuz, and Yousef (2002) and Kamaruddin, Safa, and Mohd (2008). 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of the study population and the selected sample 
* The number of tested banks is significantly reduced due to the exclusion of:  
I) the new banks (age ≤ 4 years),  
II) all banks other than the commercial banks,  
III) banks whose financial statements were incorporated with their parent banks, and  
IV) banks with limited published data 7  
** full list of banks being tested were shown in the appendix. 
 
 
Empirical studies generally use the banks‘total assets as a proxy of their size. We classify Islamic and 
conventional banks based on average total assets. Banks worth more than £1.5 bn of assets are categorized as large 
banks, meanwhile, banks worth less are categorized as small.
8
 We extract the panel data
 
set from non-consolidated 
financial statements and employ the computer program (DEAP-version 2.1) which was written by Coelli (1996) to 
construct DEA-frontiers for the calculation of (TE) and (SE) within the selected period. 
 
In the DEA model, if the number of DMUs is small, then an overestimation of efficiency estimates may 
result (Alirezaei, Howland and Van de Panne, 1998). This is, however, not an issue in our sample because our 
sample size is large enough. We manage to include all possible banks and valuable input and output variables in the 
analysis. The number of inputs and outputs in the DEA model should also be addressed. A DEA model with a higher 
number of variables will have higher efficiency estimates, thus efficient banks on the frontier will be overestimated. 
If the number of DMUs (n) is less than the combined number of output and input (O+I); large portion of the DMUs 
will be identified as efficient. Hence, it is preferred that (n) exceeds (I+O) several times. In this paper, we follow 
Cooper et al. (2007) and Darrat et al. (2002) who suggest that in order to have an appropriate number of inputs and 
outputs (to minimize biased estimations) the product of inputs times outputs should optimally be less than the 
sample size (I*O≤ N). Based on that, the number of banks (DMUs) in each sample model of our analysis is larger 
than the product of 3 inputs and 2 outputs. 
 
Moreover, one of the most important assumptions to apply DEA is that the DMUs must be homogenous 
units; they should be performing the same tasks and should have similar objective. This is actually the case of our 
sample in which both Islamic and conventional banks have the same individual final objective to earn profit even if 
there is differences in how to reach this goal. 
                                                 
7 For instance, in Qatar: Alasfa Islamic bank and Masraf al Rayan are new banks. In KSA: Alinma bank is new. In Kuwait: 
Kuwait international bank is new; Jabeer Islamic bank is under foundation. In Bahrain: Alsalam bank Bahrain is new. In UAE: 
Emirates Global Islamic bank, Noor Islamic bank, Alhilal bank, and Ajman bank are new; Dubai bank converted to Islamic 
operations in 2007. In Malaysia: the excluded banks are all new e.g., Affin Islam bank berhat, Alliance Islamic bank Malaysia, 
Amislamic bank, Hong leong Islamic bank, KFH-Malaysia, and standard chartered saadiaq. In Turkey: Bank Asia is private 
Finance house; turkiye Finans is new; Cyprus Islamic bank is an offshore bank. Oman has no Islamic banks during our study 
period (2005-08). According to the FAS as on 30 April, 2009 there are 158 banks incorporated in the UK. This number has been 
shrunk to 19 which is mainly due to the excluded of the: 1) Private Banks such as SG Hambros Bank. 2) Investment banks such 
as Dresdner Kleinwort. 3) Merchant banks like Gulf International Bank (UK). 4) Banks with special functions like Wesleyan 
Bank. 5) Development banks such as Crown Agents Bank. 6) Wholesale banks like CIBC World Markets. 7) New banks such as 
Europe Arab Bank. 8) All banks whose annual report is consolidated with the parent banks such as: ICICI Bank UK Plc, FBN 
Bank (UK), Reliance Bank Ltd and Ruffler Bank. 9), Islamic windows, such as Hsbc-Amanah. 
8 There is no best description of the key characteristics of small and large banks. According to Federal Deposits Insurance 
Corporation (2008), the banks that had assets of less than $1.061 bn, as of December 31 of either of the prior two calendar years, 
are considered "small". In this paper, we define the banks which accounts for the top percentile of all banks‘aggregate total assets 
in each banking industry and constitute 85% or so of the total, as “large banks” and those below this level as “small banks”. We 
decide to use £ 1.5 bn of assets as the best cut point for our sample banks. However, in order to classify banks more accurately, 
we have also adopted number of other factors. These factors are; the bank‘s market share (measured by total deposits) and the 
number of employees in each bank. 
Types of banks Population Sample* Country Bank Size 
    Small Large 
I.   Islamic bank 50 21 (GCC)-States, Turkey, Malaysia, and UK** 12 9 
II. Conventional  bank  158 19 UK 6 13 
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3.3. Selection of input and output variables  
 
While the multi-product nature of the banking firms is recognized in the literature, there is still no 
agreement as to the definition and measurement of bank inputs and outputs. The banking literature is divided 
concerning this issue. Researchers take one of two approaches labeled the intermediation and the production 
approach. The production approach views banks as producers of loan and deposit services using the traditional 
factors of production i.e. capital and labor. In the intermediation approach, banks act as financial intermediary to 
collect deposits and purchased funds, then transform these into loans and other assets. The intermediation approach 
is preferable to the production approach to model bank behavior. This is because it does not exclude interest 
expenses, which accounts for a significant level of bank’s total costs. In this paper, we follow Yudistira (2004) who 
uses the DEA intermediation approach arguing that the basic principle of Islamic financial system is the 
participation in enterprise, employing the funds based on the profit and loss sharing (PLS). This, inevitably implies 
the importance of Islamic bank‘s intermediary activities. 
 
Our DEA-model consists of three-inputs and two-output. More specifically, we use "total deposits and 
short term funding", "total expenses" and "total staff cost or personal expenses” as inputs. Earning assets, "total 
loans" and "total revenues", represent the model outputs (Table 2). However, total expenses and total revenues are 
used as inputs and outputs, respectively, because interest plus non-interest expenses (total expenses), and interest 
plus non-interest income (total revenues) are considered as the key variables that influence wealth maximization. In 
our analysis, we replace the interest in conventional banks with income distributed to the depositors in Islamic banks 
to make the comparison between both types of banks accurate. Table 10 (appendix) presents the summary statistics 




The inputs-outputs used in the DEA models 9 
 
 
The degree of correlation between inputs and outputs has a significant impact on the robustness of the DEA 
model. Hence, a correlation analysis is imperative to establish
 
appropriate inputs and outputs (Chaparro, Jimenez, 
and Smith, 1999). The correlation between an input (output) variable with other output (input) variable needs to be 
strong (high) as the efficiency scores depend on the choice of input and output variables (Lønborg, 2005). If an input 
(output) variable has low correlation with all the output (input) variables, it may indicate that this variable does not 
fit the model (Yang, 2009). Results of correlation analysis for each pair of variables are presented in Table 11 in the 
appendix. As it can be seen, the correlation coefficients between input and output variables and within input 
variables are high. This means that the bank performance is highly explained by the predictors variables, which is 
true in the context of Islamic banking, hence, this is a reasonable validation of our DEA models. For instance, the 
higher comparative performance of Islamic banks deposits requires higher interest expenses, which account for a 




                                                 
9  Total deposits include: current, saving and investment deposits from customers, banks and other financial institutions. Total 
staff costs include: wages, salaries, allowances, bonuses, and other staff related costs. In the context of Islamic banking, on the 
one hand, total loans (the non interest-bearing loans) include financing to customer's banks and other financial institutions that 
structured under: Murabaha, Ijarah rental, Mudaraba, Istisna, and Musharaka, etc. On the other hand, total revenues include 
income from investment of depositor‘s, shareholder‘s funds and others in the form of Murabaha, Bei Ajel, Musharaka, income 
from investment in Sukuk, income from Islamic financing assets and placement, management and arrangement fees, income from 
international Murabaha, commission, fees and foreign exchange, property related income and return to unrestricted investment 
accounts, etc.  
No. Inputs Outputs 
1. I 1: Total Deposits
 and short term funding  O 1: Total loans  
2. I 2: Total Expenses  O 2: Total Revenues
  
3. I 3: Total Staff Cost
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3.4. The DEA model 
 
To illustrate the applications of DEA, assume we have a set of DMUs where each DMU transforms (n) 
inputs to (m) outputs. The efficient DMUs will have the highest ratio of the weighted sum of outputs to the weighted 
sum of inputs. For each DMU, efficiency (es) is calculated as follows (Yudistira, 2004): 
 
                                           
 
   
 
   
 
 
For a particular DMU,  is is the quantity of the ith output produced whereas xjs is the quantity of the jth input. 
 i is the output weight while  j is the input weight. es is then maximized under the condition that the ratios for all 
DMUs are " ≤ 1" as follows: 
  
                                            
 
   
 
   
 
 
Where Eq.1 ensures that the efficiency ratios are at most one and Eq.2 guarantees that inputs and outputs 
have positive weights. However, there is a problem with the above formulation due to the unlimited number of 
solutions it may produce because of its fractional function. Following Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), the 
fractional linear program can be transformed into an ordinary linear program: 
 
minimize    = 
      
 





                        
 
   
 
   
 
    
                         
 
   
 
Furthermore, the above program can be transformed into the dual problem as follows: 
 





          
 
   
         
 
 
                 
 
   
        
 
          
 
    
 
Where (  ) is the overall technical efficiency (TE) scores of the sth DMUs. The unity value of 1 indicates 
the DMU is on the frontier "OC" as shown in Fig. 1. Thus, it is considered to be efficient. The DMU that is located 
to the right of frontier is considered as inefficient which is shown as point "S" in Fig. 1. The (  ) for "S" is then 
computed by the ratio of (AQ/AS). This yields that the DMU must reduce (1 -   ) of the input in order to arrive to an 
efficient DMU at point Q. If the linear programming equations (3) and (4) are solved by adding the restriction of φrs 
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Fig. 1 as VV‘; and the pure technical efficiency (PTE) which is given by "ρs = AR/AS".10  This means that the SE, 
which is defined as the extent to which a DMU can take advantage of return to scale by altering its size to achieve 
the optimal scale, is calculated by σs =   /ρs. The fraction of output lost due to scale inefficiency can be measured as 
(1 - σs) (Yudistira, 2004). 
 
 
Figure. 1: Efficiency measurements using one output and one input 
Source: Yudistira, 2004 
 
 
SE equals one if and only if the technology exhibits CRS (point "B" in Fig.1). Scale inefficiency may exist 
due to either increasing (IRS) or decreasing (DRS) return to scale. To obtain these two possible results, the solution 
of linear programming problems 3 and 4 must be restricted within the sum of the φr from 1 to N is ≤ 1 in which the 
pictorial solution can be shown as "OBV" in Fig. 1. The efficiency measure from this technology for the DMU at 
point S is θs = AQ/AS which also equals ξs. Thus, DRS can be found when σs = θs and IRS when σs ≠ θs. Above all, 
efficiency appears when σs = θs =    = 1 (Yudistira, 2004). 
 
A DMU is considered efficient if it has a score of 100% and all slacks are zeros in relation to others. If 
efficiency score is 100% (at the optimal solution) and some of the slack variables are non-zeros, then there exists a 
combination of other units which does not dominate the current output vector of the reference DMU but rather it 
uses less resources. These DMUs may be termed as weakly efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In DEA, "slack" 
can be defined as overuse of input or under production of output that exists even there is a proportional change in the 
inputs or the outputs. It represents the improvements needed to convert an inefficient unit to an efficient unit. These 
improvements are in the form of an increase/decrease in inputs or outputs. Slack might be considered as the amount 
of inefficiency exhibited by non-efficient DMUs and possibly a consequence of poor performance of inputs, outputs 
or both. If inputs are being used ineffectively, then we have input slack, and conversely we will have output slack. 
 
As indicated by Coelli, (1996), there are three choices regarding the treatment of slacks: i) One-stage DEA, 
to calculate slacks residually, ignoring the need for a second optimization step. ii) Two-stage DEA, to move to an 
efficient frontier by maximizing the sum of slacks required to move from the first-stage projected point to another, 
and iii) Multi-stage DEA, to conduct a sequence of radial linear programs to identify the efficient projected point. In 
this proposed paper, we utilize the multi-stage DEA as it is computationally more rigorous and demanding. "The 
                                                 
10 In order to be economically efficient, a bank must first be TE. TE represents the capacity and willingness of an economic unit 
to produce the maximum attainable output from a given set of inputs and technology. TE is critical to measuring the bank 
performance, determining the degree of innovative technology adoption and the overall production efficiency. Profit 
maximization requires a bank to produce the maximum output given the level of inputs employed (i.e. be technically efficient), 
use the right mix of inputs in light of the relative price of each input (i.e. be input allocative efficient), and produce the right mix 
of outputs given the set of prices (i.e. be output allocative efficient). 
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benefits of multi-stage DEA is that it identifies efficient projected points which have input and output mixes that are 
as similar as possible to those of the inefficient points, and also it is invariant to units of measurement" (Coelli, 
1996). 
 
We applied the DEA approach to further examine the input and output "targets" for a bank. These targets 
are the results of respective slack values added on to original outputs, and subtracted from original inputs. Moreover, 
target for outputs are calculated by multiplying optimal efficiency scores by the outputs and then adding the slack 
values to that value. However, it should be noted that some of the efficiency improvement options and the target 
values may not be applicable and cannot be implemented. 
 
3.5. Adjustment to the environmental influences: A two-stage DEA-based estimation  
 
Our sample data considered in this analysis has been adjusted for the differences among sample countries 
by converting into the UK (£) currency using end of year market rates obtained from respective central banks. All 
variables in all models have been also deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of each country in order to 
account for macro-economic differences across countries during the sample period. Furthermore, to test the 
statistical association of the efficiency estimates with variables that are not inputs and outputs, and to determine their 
influence on the bias-corrected efficiency scores, we perform the second- stage of DEA method as suggested by 
Coelli, Prasada, O'Donnell, and Battese (2005). After solving for DEA in the first-stage, the efficiency scores are 
then regressed upon the environmental variables which could potentially influence the efficiency of a bank. 
 
In DEA, the dependent variable has an upper limit of 100%, and therefore it is a censored variable. If such 
censoring was the only concern then Tobit regression could have been used.
 11 
But, we have to deal with biases 
caused by inefficiency; therefore, Tobit regression is not valid (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). McDonald (2009) 
advocates using (OLS) in the DEA second-stage because it is considered as a consistent estimator. The following 








   
Where the subscript "j" refers to a bank and the subscript "t" refers to a sample year. The dependent variable "es" 
represents the bank‘s pure technical efficiency (DEAPTE). Detailed description on the independent variables is 
illustrated in Table 12 (appendix). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section describes first the DEA results with respect to the efficiency of Islamic banking sector, 
followed by the results of the second-stage DEA based analysis. It further considers the results from the bank‘s 
financial ratio analysis, the correlation analysis of the DEA efficiency scores with financial performance and, 
eventually, the analysis of the efficiency – profitability matrix. 
                                                 
11 The standard Tobit model assumes that the dependent variable is censored with a limiting value 0 and values ranging between 
0 and 1. 
12  Under certain assumptions, OLS gives the best result. It is considred as the Best Linear Unbiazed Estimator "BLUE". OLS is 
quite sensitive to the presence of outliers and hence we use "Casewise Diagnostics" in SPSS to test for this issue. As a rule of 
thumb, outliers are points whose standardized residual is greater than 3.3 (corresponding to the .001 alpha level). Based on our 
analysis, results confirmed the absence of outliers in our sample.  
13  In this paper, the efficiency of Islamic banks is analyzed based on binary comparisons. Two regression models (E1 and E2) 
were basically measured. The first model (E1: model-M1 and model-M2) measures the relative efficiency of IBB against small 
and large Islamic banks from Muslim countries (SIBs and LIBs respectively). The second model (E2: model-M3 and model-M4) 
investigates the relative efficiency performance of the IBB against small and large conventional banks in the UK (SCBs and 
LCBs), respectively. Empirically, in E2, the dummy   12Islam.jt" is added and the variable   10GDP.jt" is replaced by   10Diver.jt". 
The endogenous "DEAPTE" is the pure technical efficiency (PTE) of the ith bank in period t, while, "ε", is the error term. The 
description of the exogenous variables and the "OLS" main statistical issues are shown in Table 12 and 13 in the appendix. 
E.1
13
: ( es )  =                +         +         +             
       
 
        +         +         +          
     
 
        +           +          +ε 
(5) 
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4.1.    Efficiency of Islamic banking sector  
 
Table 5 illustrates the DEA-efficiency scores of IBB relative to small Islamic banks from Muslim countries 
(SIBs) listed in model-M1. The results appear in the table indicates that the IBB has efficiency scores of less than 1 
(DEAPTE<1) in each sample year. Hence, it is identified as technically inefficient. The bank‘s mean PTE, based on 
all sample years, is only 35.2% (calculated as: (91.9%+30.6%+38.1%+40.1%)/4). Thus, it carries out operations, on 
average, at a significant distance from the efficiency frontier (DEAEF), (Chart 1- appendix). 
 
The bank‘s inefficiency primarily comes from the revenue side, (output slacks (Revenues) > input slacks (Costs)). 
That is, the bank has non-zero slacks in generating revenues but it has very limited non-zero slacks in the usage of 
recourses (excess costs) (Table 5.1- model-M1). Consequently, IBB is better in utilizing resources and controlling 
costs than generating optimal outputs. These results demonstrate that the IBB has definitely substantial room for 
improvements in the efficiency by reducing costs further and increasing revenues to sustain competitive edge in the 
European banking industry. 
 
We summarize the findings further by examining the "efficient output-input targets" for IBB. In order to 
catch up with (lies closer to) the frontier over time in model-M1, IBB is required to increase its output (total 
revenues) by £8.604, £9.272, £9.768 and £12.362 bn during 2005 through 2008, respectively. The bank cannot 
achieve the efficient target levels by augmenting revenues only. The other output (total loans) cannot also be 
increased because it has zero-slacks. Consequently, IBB should then have reduced its total costs by £1.276 and 
£1.271 bn in 2006 and 2007 respectively, (Table 5.1). 
 
The results seem to imply that the IBB is not only technically inefficient but also inefficient in exploiting 
the economies of scale given its scale of operations. The inappropriate size (scale) of a bank‘s operation level 
(DEASE)
 14
 (too large or too small) can lead to overall (total) inefficiency. In 2005, IBB exhibits an increasing return 
to scale (DEAIRS), and thus, operates at a scale that is too small. The bank could improve efficiency by scaling up its 
activities by 3.7% (calculated as 1- 96.3%) reaching the score of unity in 2005. In the following three years (2006, 
2007, and 2008), the bank has decreasing return to scale (DEADRS) with DEASE scores  of 93.1%, 96.8%, and 99% 
respectively. This reveals that the bank is operating at scale that is overly large and thus should shrink the output 
endowments and activities. 
 
By and large, the overall (technical) inefficiency of IBB appears to be mostly due to pure technical 
inefficiency (DEAPTE). This is due to the low pure technical efficiency in comparison to scale efficiency (DEAPTE < 
(DEA SE). For instance, the DEASE, 2005= 96.3% > 31.9%, and the DEASE, 2006= 93.1% > 30.6%, etc. Since the 
DEAPTE captures the management practices while the DEASE indicates whether the bank operates at optimal 
economies of scale, the above results suggest that inefficiencies are mostly due to inefficient management practices 
rather than the size of the bank’s operation. 
 
In comparison with small conventional banks (SCBs) in model-M3, the results reveal that IBB fails again 
to appear on the efficiency frontier over the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. IBB is also inefficient compared to the peer 
conventional banks except Turkish bank (UK) Limited (Chart 3-appendix). The bank’s inefficiency results from the 
cost (input) side as input slacks is greater than output slacks. The bank could decrease its total expenses and staff 
cost only by, £ 2.71 and £ 0.986 bn in 2005, £ 2.211 and £ 1.861 bn in 2006, £ 1.259 and £ 1.443 bn in 2007 
respectively, (Table 7.1). Based on the results shown in Table 7, IBB has a high DEADRS through years 2006-2008 
with DEASE equal 91.6%, 90.8%, and 92.2%, respectively. These results show that the bank is scale inefficient. 
Banks pure technical inefficiency again dominates scale inefficiency. This implies that the main source of banks’ 
inefficiency is the managerial inadequacy rather than non- optimal size of operations.  
 
In model-M2 and model-M4 we compare the efficiency of the IBB against large Islamic banks from 
Muslim-majority countries and also against the counterparties-conventional banks in the UK (LIBs and LCBs) 
                                                 
14  Scale efficiency (SE) = TE CRS/ TE VRS. (SE) can be interpreted as follows: (i) If SE = 1, then a bank is scale efficient and thus, 
its combination of inputs and outputs is efficient both under CRS and VRS. (ii) If (SE <1) or (SE > 1), then the combination is 
not scale efficient. 
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respectively. IBB is recognized as inefficient in both models. It has efficiency scores of less than one each year. By 
and large, IBB is inefficient compared to peer banks. The bank however, has relatively better efficiency performance 
compared with LIBs but it reports worse performance compared with LCBs. Results show that, while the bank has 
an increasing trend in efficiency scores compared with large Islamic banks, it has unstable efficiency performance in 
comparison with large conventional banks. Bank’s inefficiency primarily results from the revenue side in model-M2 
but in model-M4 it comes from the cost side. IBB has low scale efficiency in both model-M2 and model-M4. PTE 
scores are consistently higher than the scale efficiency scores. This indicates that the bank is scale inefficient 
(operating at non-optimal level of operations) and it could improve its efficiency by increasing outputs substantially 
(Tables 6.1 and 8.1). 
 
Considering all results from model-M1 through model-M4, it should be noted that the best efficiency 
performance of IBB appears first in model-M3 followed directly by model-M2, model-M4, and model-M1 
respectively, (Charts 1 through 4-the appendix). In model-M3, the bank is only 8.6% (calculated as: 1- (average 
DEAPTE (2005-2008)) = (1+90.1%+89.8%+85.6%) /4 = 0.914) far away from the DEAEF, value of 1. In model-M2, IBB 
is 19.3% away from the frontier (1-0.807 = 19.3%). This amount is much less than the amount the bank requires to 
become efficient compared with the (LCBs) in model-M4 (1- 0.618 = 38.2%) and with the (SCBs) in model-M1 (1- 
0.352 = 64.8%). 
 
The information on efficiency results from Islamic banks grouped by regional area and bank size provides 
significant insight into the analysis. It displays that the small Islamic and conventional banks are more efficient than 
large banks. For instance, (SIBs) from (GCC)-States have relatively a higher average mean efficiency score of 
90.2% (calculated as: ): for a particular bank,  is the efficiency scores 
over the sample period, (n) is the number of years, while (N) represents the number of banks), as compared to the 
(LIBs = 81.3%) from the same region. Similarly, (SIBs) from the Malaysian banking industry records relatively high 
average efficiency score of 83.5% compared to a low mean efficiency scores of 55.4% attained by (LIBs ). 
Likewise, (SCBs) from the UK tend to have higher mean efficiency scores of 96.7% compared to 81% achieved by 
(LCBs). This clearly suggests that the "bigger is not necessarily better ". That is to say, the larger the bank, the less 
efficient it is and the more it can be affected by the financial instability. 
 
The results from the 4-DEA models show that the small Islamic banks in Muslim countries and the IBB in 
the UK have initially a declining trend in average DEAPTE over 2005-2007. In spite of the adverse market conditions 
in 2008, small Islamic banks show a sudden increase in efficiency performance with a higher rate compared with 
small and large conventional banks and large Islamic banks (Chart 5). IBB has a small asset-size. It is newly-
established bank. It has also a set of religious financial constraints. This plays an important role in preventing the 
bank, as well as all other small Islamic banks, from being severely affected by the global economic crisis and 
consequently, producing a positive efficiency trend. 
  
4.2. Determinants of bank‘s efficiency: The (OLS) - regression analysis 
 
The second-stage DEA based analysis reveals a different set of results. Similar to Darrat et al. (2002) and 
Miller and Noulas (1996), who report a positive relationship between efficiency and bank‘s size, our findings also 
suggest that the size variable is positively related to banks DEAPTE, statistically significant at 1% level in model-M2, 
model-M3, and model-M4, (Table 9). Contrary to results from the first stage DEA illustrated in section 4.1 (i.e. the 
largest scale inefficiencies come from large size banks), the outcomes of DEA in this stage suggest that large banks 
are relatively more efficient compared to small banks, apparently due to economies of scale effect. A bank indeed 
sustains a competitive advantage when economies of scale effects are present.
 15, 16
 
                                                 
15  Under ideal conditions, regression and DEA techniques should produce similar results. This is not the case in practice since 
application of these two techniques on the same data set often produces strikingly different results"(Cubbins and Tzanikadis, 
1998). 
16  There are two main theories about the relationship between bank characteristics and efficiency. The shakeout theory proposes 
that smaller banks may not be able to obtain management ability and enough capital to successfully operate thus, suggesting a 
positive relationship between size and performance. Alternatively, "the divisibility theory which holds that there will be no such 
operational advantage accruing to large banks, if the technology is divisible, that is, small-scale banks can produce financial 
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Our results also reveal a significant negative relationship between the large banks pure technical efficiency 
and leverage in model-M2 and model-M4 at 5% and 0.1% level respectively.
 17
 Such result suggests that the higher 
performing large banks should acquire less debt. This is because, a higher leverage is related to higher agency costs 
because of the diverging interests between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This moral 
hazard problem implies a higher risk-taking tendency which could result in greater borrowing costs (Casu and 
Molyneux, 2003) and low efficiency. Large banks, however, would be subject to systemic risk and possible crises if 
they were highly leveraged. A small drop in the asset value of a highly leveraged bank leads to distress and possible 
insolvency particularly in adverse market conditions.
 
 
Findings, on the other hand, show that the coefficient of the leverage variable is positive and significant at 
10% level in model-M3. This suggests that the small banks with high levels of leverage should be more efficient. 
This is because leverage, to a reasonable extent, could allow small-sized bank to make lots of safer loans and 
therefore plenty of investment returns than larger banks can do. In contrast to results for large banks, leverage could 
reduce agency costs for small banks and thus have positive effects on efficiency. Leverage may also increase the 
pressure on banks managers to perform better, because it reduces the moral hazard behavior (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Our regression results also show that the accounting measurements (ROA and ROE) have significant 
positive effects on banks efficiency almost in all models, (Table 9).
18
 This indicates that more profitable banks are 
also more efficient.
 
It is common that banks having higher profitability are usually preferred by clients. Therefore, 
they attract the largest share of deposits and the best potential creditworthy borrowers as well. This creates favorable 
conditions for the profitable banks to be more efficient. 
 
The findings obtained from DEA-first stage suggest that the overall IBB performs relatively better than 
some of small and large Islamic banks in Muslim-majority countries, apparently due to its shortened learning curve. 
Second-stage regression analysis results, in contrast, show that the relationship between the dummy variable region, 
(1= if the bank is located in Europe, IBB for example), and a bank‘s DEAPTE is significantly negative in model-M1 
and model-M2 at 10% and 0.1% level, respectively. This implies that geographical location is a differentiating 
factor, while assessing the efficiency of banks, which might in part, be due to the unique regulations in the country 
where the bank operates. Such results demonstrate that small Islamic banks in Europe (IBB in our case) are less 
efficient than Islamic banks (either small or large) operating in the Middle East (GCC-States), Southeastern Asia 
(Malaysia) and Eurasia (Turkey). This indicates, however, that the Islamic banks outside Muslim-majority countries 
experienced more difficulties, particularly during the global economic crisis, to reach the optimal levels of efficiency 
which could be due to strict conventional regulations. 
 
The proxy of market share (the total deposits) reveals a statistically significant negative relationship with 
the DEAPTE in model-M2, model-M3, and model-M4 at 1%, 0.1% and 5% levels, respectively. This suggests lower 
market share is associated with the banks which enjoy a higher degree of efficiency thus diminishing the market 
leadership argument.  Such a result implies that banks with small market share can be equally efficient or even more 
compared to market dominant banks. It appears that maintaining or expanding markets share might involve 
additional costs and resources that might reduce efficiency. 
 
Based on our analysis, results indicate that the dummy variable (ISLAM) is negatively statistically 
significant predictor of banks’ performance at 1% level in Model-M3 (IBB is the only Islamic bank in this model). 
The coefficient of this predictor shows a significant smaller DEAPTE scores for IBB compared to other banks. Such a 
result offer evidence that the small conventional banks in the UK perform considerably different and relatively 
better than IBB in terms of efficiency performance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
services at costs per unit output comparable to those of large banks, suggesting no or possibly negative association between size 
and performance" (Sufian, 2007). 
17  Size variable is significant in model-M3 (but not model-M1). Although SCBs, IBB, and SIBS have assets of less than £1.5 bn, 
an examination of banks financial statements reveal that SCBs and SIBs are still larger than IBB. So, apparently they enjoy 
relative scale economies over IBB.  
18  Due to the high correlation between ROA and ROE (model-M1, r= 0.795. model-M2, r=0.933, model-M3, r=0.913, model-
M4, r=0.821), the later measure was dropped from the analysis. 
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Previously we observed that the dependency factor has an insignificant relationship with DEAPTE in the 
context of Islamic banking. Nevertheless, results from the conventional banking industry, in model-M3 and model-
M4, show a significant inverse relationship between the two variables at 10% and 5% level, respectively. These 
findings illustrate that subsidiaries, or conventional banks acting as a part of a banking group, have lower efficiency 
scores compared to the stand alone banks.
19 
 
To control the bank-specific lending intensity, we use total loans divided by total assets as a proxy. Bank 
loans are expected to be the main source of revenue thus, are expected to impact efficiency positively. In our paper, 
the proxy of bank’s loan intensity reveals an insignificant positive relationship with all DEAPTE in both, model-M1 
and model-M3. Those findings imply that banks with higher loans intensity might have either higher or lower 
efficiency. In contrast, we find a significant positive coefficient in model-M2 and model-M4 at 10% level.
20
 The 
results indicate that, loans of a bank seem to be more highly valued than alternative bank outputs, i.e. investments 
and /or securities. This might support the idea that the banks market capability to offer more competitive loan 
portfolios might be a resulted from their efficient operations. This is due to their ability to perform more 
productively with lower costs (Sufian and Zulkhibri, 2007). 
 
To capture the possible effects of the liquidity and the absence of the international inter-bank money 
markets for Islamic banks on their efficiency, the liquid assets to total deposits and short term funding ratio is used 
as a proxy. We expect that banks with a higher amount of net liquid assets will be less efficient. Banks seek to 
balance the benefits of high levels of liquidity with the costs of high liquidity. Such balancing may adversely affect 
the investment returns. Our empirical analysis reveals an insignificant relationship between banks liquidity and their 
performance in model-M1, model-M3, and model-M4. Surprisingly, the predictor variable (liquidity) in model-M2 
reveals a negative significant relationship with DEAPTE at 1% level. This indicates that large Islamic banks that 
accumulate a significant amount of liquid resources might operate under worst efficiency conditions. This also 
suggests that the excess liquidity, due to the Islamic law restrictions, has to be invested to achieve efficiency gains. 
It is worth noting that, too little liquidity might force the bank to borrow at penal rates from the interbank market 
and/or central bank. However, this is not viable for Islamic banks due to the absence of international inter-bank 
money market. 
 
With respect to the relationship between the bank‘s age and its DEAPTE, we find an insignificant negative 
association between the two variables in all models. Theoretically speaking, this could be due to the fact that older 
banks are not flexible to make the rapid adjustments to changing circumstances as opposed to new banks that have a 
short learning curve, and are considered more innovative and entrepreneurial (Kapelko, Prior-Jimènez, Rialp-
Criado, 2008). However, one stream of research suggests that new banks suffer from liability of newness. Not only 
because of the risk of their loans, but also because depositors and established banks will demand premium if they are 
to invest in these young banks (Gorton and Winton, 1998). 
 
Our results demonstrate an insignificant relationship between the product diversity and banks DEAPTE.
21
 
                                                 
19  By testing both model-M1 and model-M2 together (i.e. regardless of the size differences) the dependency measure reveals a 
significant positive relationship with the efficiency scores at 5% level. Such result indicates that the Islamic subsidiaries perform 
better than stand-alone banks. This might be due to the small size of subsidiaries since the Islamic product schemes become more 
complex as the size of Islamic banks increase which negatively affect the bank‘s efficiency. 
20  " " is the significance level that the researchers decide to accept. The choice of it is somewhat arbitrary, although in practice 
values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 are common and generally considered "acceptable". However, at a given level of alpha, the smaller 
the P- value, the higher the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
21  We find a negative insignificant relationship between the predictor "diversification" and the DEAPTE in model-M4. The 
diversification predictor has been dropped from model-M3 to allow for better results and to meet the regression main 
assumptions. This leaves the question of whether Islamic banking diversification lead to efficiency or not. However, the universal 
set of investment to Islamic banks is limited due to Shari‘ah restrictions, thus they enjoy a lower diversification benefit than their 
conventional counterparts. Furthermore, Islamic banks have facing regulations that create incentives to diversify their portfolios. 
For example, each source of financing that a bank earn raise implies a different degree and type of market discipline. Equity-
holders care about returns to their equity and might prefer riskier portfolio than would debt-holder, etc. Hence, diversification per 
service has no guarantee for better efficiency. To verify the proposition of less diversified Islamic banks, we test the differences 
in the structure of the bank’s income. Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we calculate the measure of income diversity as 
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The results fail to produce a conclusive and casual correlation between increased investment in skills and increased 
efficiency. Efficiency of human resource management has shown a statistically insignificant relationship with 
DEAPTE.
22
 In theory, personal expenses are estimated to impact performance negatively because efficient banks are 
expected to operate at lower cost. Despite of that, the usage of new electronic technology has made the wage 
expenses to fall, therefore, the lower cost ratio may impact performance positively. 
 
Eventually, results failed to find any evidence of an association between the growth rate of GDP and the 
banks DEAPTE. Our results do not support the idea that the favorable economic conditions seem to stimulate higher 
efficiency due to supposedly positive effect on the demand and supply for banking services. 
 
4.3. An overview on the bank‘s Financial Ratios Based Analysis - (FRA)  
 
We extend the study further by examining the determinants (the exogenous variables) of a bank’s 
efficiency. Results reveal that, the small Islamic banks from Muslim-majority countries and IBB from the UK 
demonstrate stronger capital adequacy ratios compared to large conventional banks. Small conventional banks are 
better run compared to all other banks in the sample (Table 14-appendix). It is significantly more complex for 
Islamic banks to adjust their credit risk monitoring system as they become bigger. Large Islamic banks tend to 
engage more in profit and loss sharing (PLS) arrangements compared to small ones thus, monitoring (PLS) schemes 
becomes more diverse and difficult to standardize which results in adverse selection and moral hazard (Čihák, and 
Hesse, 2008). However, large Islamic banks from Muslim countries are financially outperforming small Islamic 
banks from (GCC)-States and Malaysia. This could be partially due to the better diversification and/or economies of 
scale. 
 
Financial results further illustrate that there is a slight difference in profitability, liquidity and leverage 
between the IBB and other banks in the sample. IBB is relatively superior in terms of lending intensity and capital 
adequacy, which enables the bank to offer more reasonable terms on loans, attain higher profitability, and ultimately 
gain a larger market shares over the inefficient banks. Empirical evidence from (ROE) tends to show that IBB has 
certainly an increasing trend in profitability in contrast to some of its conventional peers in same size, thanks to 
profit and loss sharing, making its profitability less volatile. "The main reason for such a difference is that Islamic 
banks benefit from a market imperfection, i.e. the availability of large amounts of non-remunerated deposits in their 
books, which considerably decrease the cost of funding" (Hassoune, 2001). 
 
4.4. Correlation of DEA efficiency scores with financial performance 
 
To examine the relationship between efficiency and profitability, we estimate the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables. We are interested in investigating whether the DEA results are consistent with the 
traditional accounting measures commonly used for comparing performance of Islamic banks. We first use ROA 
and ROE as measures of bank’s profits. We then calculate the "Spearman's rho" correlations, between the estimated 
DEA efficiency scores and the bank's profitability ratios, because it is an efficient estimator regardless of the 
distributions of variables. It also minimizes the effect of outliers on correlation coefficients. The null hypothesis 
states that the correlation coeﬃcient between variables is zero. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
"income diversity=1-(net interest income-other operating income / total operating income)". This variable captures the degree to 
which banks diversify from traditional lending activities to other activities. For Islamic banks, the net interest income is generally 
defined as the sum of the positive and negative income flows associated with the PLS arrangements. Consequently, the result of 
our simple calculations of diversification implies that conventional banks in general are much diversified than Islamic banks. For 
example but not limited, the average value of diversity measure during the period 2005-2006 for IBB is 10% whereas it is much 
higher for Bank of Beirut (UK) with about 43%.  
22  The predictor "personal expenses" shows an insignificant relationship with efficiency in all models. Strikingly, when we 
measure the effect of skills utilization on efficiency for all Islamic banks (small & large) which are operating in Muslim 
countries, analysis reveals a significant positive relationship with the efficiency scores (t=2.868, p<0.01). This indicates that there 
is a casual correlation between increased investment in labor and banks efficiency. 
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It is clear from Table 3 below that the correlation coeﬃcients of accounting measures are statistically and 
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in model-M1 and model-M2 (IBB, and small and large Islamic banks from Muslim-
majority countries, respectively). This suggests that the efficiency measures are strongly associated with traditional 
accounting measures of performance in relation to the Islamic banking industry, and thus can easily be used by 
Islamic banks as a substitute of conventional accounting measures of performance. Such findings support Isik and 




The correlation coefficients between DEA PTE scores and accounting measures 
*: Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),  
**: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
In contrast, the accounting measures are found to be relatively statistically insignificant in model-M3 and 
model-M4 (small and large conventional banks in the UK, respectively). This indicates that the information 
contained in the standard accounting measures are not closely corresponded to that contained in eﬃciency measures 
in the UK conventional banking system. The main argument is that environmental factors could affect the attainment 
of profitability. 
 
4.5. The efficiency – profitability matrix  
 
In this analysis, we primarily focus on evaluating the performance of small Islamic and conventional banks 
based on an efficiency-profitability matrix (Table 4). The median value is used to split the matrix into two halves to 
create high and low groups of profitability, as measured by ROA, and efficiency scores as measured by DEA. We 




The efficiency – profitability matrix 
* "N" represents the number of banks being tested in this matrix in each model (i.e. NM1= 12, NM3= 7)  
**including IBB  
*** IBB per se. 
 
 
The star quadrant consists of DMUs which exhibit a high level of profitability and efficiency and thus, 
considered as the flagship banks. The banks falling in sleeper category have high profitability but low efficiency 
which is not a good sign from long-term perspective. These sleeper banks are profitable due to primarily more 
favorable environmental conditions than good management. The question marks category has low profitability and 
low efficiency. They have a potential for greater efficiency and possibly greater profits. The dogs have a low 
profitability but high efficiency hence, they are efficient, but are still not profitable. They are efficiently operated 
units but low on profitability due to an unfavorable environment. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the IBB falls in the question marks quadrant. This indicates that the bank has a 
low profitability and efficiency. Consequently, IBB is considered as under-performing but has the potential to 
increase its operating efficiency. By and large, IBB is probably under-resourced and lacks appropriate skills. Thus, 
ROE ROA The model Correlation matrix 
0.346* 0.366* M1  
0.546** 0.609** M2 DEAPTE (VRS) 
0.215 0.154 M3  
0.050 0.317* M4  
Profitability (ROA): 
High Sleeper                 M1 :( N*=3 or 25%). M3 :( N=3 or 43%) Star    M1 :( N=3 or 25%).  M3 :( N=2 or 29%) 
Low Question Mark     M1 :( N=4 or 33%) **. M3: (N=1 or 14%) *** Dogs  M1 :( N=2 or 17%).  M3 :( N=1 or 14%) 
DEAPTE   Low High 
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with a favorable environment and additional resources, it can be expected to enhance its efficiency and profitability 




Results based on the extensive analysis in this paper show that the IBB is technically inefficient. It has, on 
average, a poor and under-performing financial performance. IBB is also inefficient in exploiting the economies of 
scale given its scale of operations. It appears that the IBB inefficiency is driven, to a large extent, by inadequate 
management compared with small Islamic banks in Muslim-majority countries and small conventional banks from 
the UK. In comparison with large banks, either Islamic or conventional, the IBB relative inefficiency becomes 
largely due to the non-optimal size. 
 
IBB, however, exhibits, in comparison to other Islamic banks, an increasing trend in efficiency 
performance over sample years due to small size and newness. IBB, as well as all small Islamic banks, tend also to 
have better financial performance than large Islamic banks mainly due to credit risk monitoring arrangements. Large 
conventional banks, on average, have an upward trend of estimated efficiency, generally with declining increments. 
Despite the prevailing market conditions being adverse, small Islamic banks (including IBB) and small conventional 
banks exhibit initially, compared to the large Islamic and conventional banks, poor efficiency scores which 
subsequently gradually increase with the passage of time. These results show that, with a favorable environment and 
additional resources, IBB has a substantial room for improvements to sustain its competitive edge in the banking 
industry by reducing costs and increasing revenues. However, IBB is, on average, better in utilizing its resources and 
controlling costs than generating optimal levels of revenues. 
 
Overall, results suggest that the optimal size for the IBB to achieve better levels of efficiency performance 
is neither large nor small rather medium. The idea of medium-size banking has bloomed at the time of the current 
global crisis. Since then many small banks are becoming acquisition candidates while large banks are more affected 
by the financial instability and thus recognized as a troublesome due to the high leverage and complex risk 
exposures. 
 
Empirical findings further illustrate that the DEA-efficiency measures are highly correlated with ROA and 
ROE, and thus can be used separately or concurrently with the standard accounting measures of performance in 
determining the performance of Islamic banks in the UK (IBB) and in Muslim-majority countries. Although not 
widely used, DEA can be adopted along with financial ratios to make comparisons of performance more robust. 
However, there is an absence of such argument in the UK conventional banking system at which the information 
contained in the conventional financial measures are not closely corresponded to that contained in efficiency 
measures. 
 
Eventually, overall results suggest that the banks with higher efficiency levels are larger in size (total 
assets), tend to exhibit higher profitability and loans intensity, acquire less levels of debt, and have relatively a 
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Table 5 Summary of the bank’s DEA-efficiency scores in model-M1* 
 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M1). 
 Output Slacks Input Slacks Output Targets Input Targets 
Year 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 
2005 0.000 8.604 0.000 0.000 0.000 258.762 15.537 8.610 3.250 47.720 
2006 0.000 9.272 0.000 1.276 0.000 345.925 18.872 11.580 2.874 82.200 
2007 0.000 9.768 0.000 1.271 0.000 379.177 21.539 11.090 3.639 130.980 
2008 0.000 12.362 0.000 0.000 0.000 366.840 24.374 10.000 4.460 146.100 
  
Year The country The bank** crste vrste scale rts 
2005 UK IBB 0.307 0.319 0963 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.813 1.000 0.813 drs 
2005 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.453 0.497 0.912 drs 
2005 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.975 1.000 0.975 drs 
2005 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.893 0.898 0.994 drs 
2005 Malaysia RHB 0.790 0.793 0.995 irs 
2005 Malaysia CIMB 0.055 1.000 0.055 irs 
2005 Turkey*** Albaraka Turk 0.621 0.761 0.816 drs 
2005 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626 0.893 0.702 drs 
2006 UK IBB 0.285 0.306 0.931 drs 
2006 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.985 1.000 0.985 irs 
2006 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.596 0.614 0.970 irs 
2006 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.591 0.625 0.946 drs 
2006 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.837 0.926 0.904 drs 
2006 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.806 0.841 0.959 drs 
2006 Malaysia RHB 0.991 1.000 0.991 drs 
2006 Malaysia CIMB 0.629 0.824 0.764 irs 
2006 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.657 0.820 0.801 drs 
2006 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.691 0.986 0.701 drs 
2007 UK IBB 0.369 0.381 0.968 drs 
2007 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.635 0.671 0.947 drs 
2007 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.658 0.706 0.932 drs 
2007 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.761 0.879 0.866 drs 
2007 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.721 0.858 0.840 drs 
2007 Malaysia RHB 0.612 0.845 0.724 drs 
2007 Malaysia CIMB 0.246 0.355 0.692 drs 
2007 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.646 0.934 0.691 drs 
2007 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.629 0.948 0.663 drs 
2008 UK IBB 0.397 0.401 0.990 drs 
2008 Qatar Qatar International Islamic Bank 0.871 1.000 0.871 drs 
2008 Bahrain Khaleeji Commercial Bank 0.852 1.000 0.852 drs 
2008 Bahrain Bahrain Islamic Bank 0.522 0.758 0.689 drs 
2008 Bahrain Shamil Bank 0.811 1.000 0.811 drs 
2008 Bahrain Abc Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2008 U.A.E Sharjah Islamic Bank 0.820 1.000 0.820 drs 
2008 Kwuait Boubyan Bank 0.671 0.981 0.684 drs 
2008 Malaysia RHB 0.585 0.863 0.678 drs 
2008 Malaysia CIMB 0.549 1.000 0.549 drs 
2008 Turkey Albaraka Turk 0.675 1.000 0.675 drs 
2008 Turkey Kuveyt Turk 0.626 1.000 0.626 drs 
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Table 6:  Summary of the bank‘s DEA-efficiency scores in model-M2. 
* (Crste) = Overall (total) efficiency scores, (Vrste) =Pure technical efficiency scores (Scale) =Scale efficiency, and (rts) =return to scale. 
** All banks that have been chosen in the sample of Islamic banks, whether in GCC-States or in Malaysia, are from the top (50) Islamic 
banks as at 31/12/2007.  
*** Geographically speaking, Turkey belongs to Europe. In recent years some sources consider Turkey to be more closely aligned with 
Europe based on their modern economic and political trends. However, Turkey has become increasingly integrated with the west through 
membership in organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, OSCE and the G-20 major economies. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M2). 
 Output Slacks Input Slacks Output Targets Input Targets 
Year 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.490 2.210 8.610 3.250 47.720 
2006 0.000 5.784 1.102 0.000 0.000 161.046 10.254 10.478 4.150 82.200 
2007 0.000 6.664 0.000 0.000 0.000 206.557 13.076 11.090 4.910 130.980 
2008 0.000 3.279 0.000 0.000 7.510 169.345 8.824 10.000 4.460 138.590 
 
  
Year The country The bank crste vrste Scale rts 
2005 UK IBB 0.326 1.000 0.326 irs 
2005 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.969 1.000 0.969 irs 
2005 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.848 0.880 0.963 drs 
2005 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.512 0.517 0.992 irs 
2005 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.691 0.801 0.862 irs 
2005 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 K.S.A Aljazira 0.715 0.736 0.971 drs 
2005 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.771 1.000 0.771 irs 
2005 U.A.E DIB 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Malaysia Bank Islam(BIMB) 0.682 0.731 0.933 irs 
2006 UK IBB 0.321 0.658 0.488 irs 
2006 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.741 0.816 0.908 drs 
2006 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.590 0.593 0.995 irs 
2006 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.512 0.536 0.956 irs 
2006 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 K.S.A Aljazira 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.814 0.960 0.848 irs 
2006 U.A.E DIB 0.882 0.914 0.966 drs 
2006 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.513 0.547 0.938 irs 
2007 UK IBB 0.360 0.700 0.515 irs 
2007 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 0.956 1.000 0.956 irs 
2007 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.969 1.000 0.969 drs 
2007 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.641 0.648 0.989 drs 
2007 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.469 0.480 0.978 irs 
2007 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 K.S.A Aljazira 0.448 0.487 0.920 drs 
2007 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.774 0.825 0.939 irs 
2007 U.A.E DIB 0.831 0.854 0.973 drs 
2007 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.468 0.481 0.974 irs 
2008 UK IBB 0.394 0.869 0.453 irs 
2008 Qatar Qatar Islamic Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2008 Kuwait Kuwait Finance House  0.834 1.000 0.834 drs 
2008 Bahrain Albaraka Islamic bank Group 0.592 0.618 0.958 drs 
2008 K.S.A Bank Albilad 0.460 0.467 0.984 irs 
2008 K.S.A Al Rajhi Bank 0.918 1.000 0.918 drs 
2008 K.S.A Aljazira 0.400 0.403 0.994 irs 
2008 U.A,E Emirates Islamic Bank 0.824 0.829 0.994 irs 
2008 U.A.E DIB 0.665 0.667 0.996 drs 
2008 Malaysia Bank Islam 0.450 0.456 0.986 irs 
  Mean 0.709 0.787 0.905  
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Table 7:  Summary of the bank‘s DEA-efficiency scores in model-M3 
 
 
Table 7.1: Summary of DEA slacks and targets (IBB: model-M3) 
 Output Slacks Input Slacks Output Targets Input Targets 
Year 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.490 2.210 8.610 3.25 47.7 
2006 0.000 0.000 2.71 0.986 0.000 117.641 3.265 8.870 3.164 82.2 
2007 0.000 0.000 2.211 1.861 0.000 161.002 4.998 8.879 3.049 131 





Year The Bank crste vrste scale rts 
2005 IBB 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 893 0.916 0.975 irs 
2005 ICBC London Limited 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.873 0.905 0.966 drs 
2005 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.964 1.000 0.964 irs 
2005 Bank Leumi UK 0.896 0.993 0.902 drs 
2006 IBB 0.825 0.901 0.916 drs 
2006 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.860 0.878 0.980 irs 
2006 ICBC London Limited 0.990 1.000 0.990 irs 
2006 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.906 0.948 0.955 drs 
2006 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.670 0.899 0.746 irs 
2006 Bank Leumi UK 0.949 1.000 0.949 drs 
2007 IBB 0.815 0.898 0.908 drs 
2007 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.860 0.860 1.000 - 
2007 ICBC London Limited 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.938 0.978 0.959 drs 
2007 Ghana INT. Bnak 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 0.774 0.847 0.913 irs 
2007 Bank Leumi UK 0.964 1.000 0.964 drs 
2008 IBB 0.789 0.856 0.922 drs 
2008 Turkish Bank (UK) Limited 0.947 0.997 0.949 irs 
2008 ICBC London Limited 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2008 Habib Allied INT. Bank Plc 0.938 0.977 0.960 drs 
2008 Ghana INT. Bnak 0.884 1.000 0.884 drs 
2008 Bank of Beirut(UK)Ltd 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2008 Bank Leumi UK 0.973 1.000 0.973 drs 
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Table 8 
Summary of the  bank‘s DEA-efficiency scores in model -M4 
Year The Bank crste vrste scale rts 
2005 IBB 0.354 1.000 0.354 irs 
2005 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0.476 0.946 0.503 drs 
2005 National Westminster Bank Plc 0.636 0.667 0.953 drs 
2005 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Bank of Scotland plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 HBOS plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2005 Standard Chartered 0.445 0.517 0.861 drs 
2005 Northern Rock plc 0.926 0.927 0.998 irs 
2005 HSBC bank Plc 0.436 0.705 0.618 drs 
2005 Abbey National 0.397 0.634 0.626 drs 
2005 Alliance and Leicester 0.591 0.593 0.997 irs 
2005 Barclays PLC 0.442 0.791 0.559 drs 
2005 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.467 0.474 0.984 irs 
2005 Bradford and Bingley 0.725 0.736 0.986 irs 
2006 IBB 0.269 0.434 0.619 irs 
2006 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0.479 0.954 0.502 drs 
2006 National Westminster Bank Plc 0.625 0.937 0.667 drs 
2006 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.907 1.000 0.907 drs 
2006 Bank of Scotland plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 HBOS plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 Standard Chartered 0.443 0.511 0.868 drs 
2006 Northern Rock plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2006 HSBC bank Plc 0.432 0.737 0.586 drs 
2006 Abbey National 0.456 0.699 0.652 drs 
2006 Alliance and Leicester 0.619 0.620 0.997 irs 
2006 Barclays PLC 0.487 0.807 0.603 drs 
2006 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.557 0.575 0.969 irs 
2006 Bradford and Bingley 0.734 0.743 0.988 irs 
2007 IBB 0.254 0.413 0.616 irs 
2007 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0.504 1.000 0.504 drs 
2007 National Westminster Bank Plc 0.640 1.000 0.640 drs 
2007 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.802 0.965 0.831 drs 
2007 Bank of Scotland plc 0.982 1.000 0.982 drs 
2007 HBOS plc 0.983 1.000 0.983 drs 
2007 Standard Chartered 0.448 0.535 0.838 drs 
2007 Northern Rock plc 1.000 1.000 1.000 - 
2007 HSBC bank Plc 0.463 0.762 0.608 drs 
2007 Abbey National 0.528 0.781 0.676 drs 
2007 Alliance and Leicester 0.577 0.578 1.000 - 
2007 Barclays PLC 0.467 0.855 0.547 drs 
2007 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.404 0.410 0.986 irs 
2007 Bradford and Bingley 0.712 0.721 0.988 irs 
2008 IBB 0.255 0.624 0.409 irs 
2008 The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 0.329 1.000 0.329 drs 
2008 National Westminster Bank Plc 0.602 1.000 0.602 drs 
2008 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.347 0.885 0.392 drs 
2008 Bank of Scotland plc 0.912 1.000 0.912 drs 
2008 HBOS plc 0.862 0.986 0.874 drs 
2008 Standard Chartered 0.474 0.598 0.793 drs 
2008 Northern Rock plc 0.738 0.738 1.000 - 
2008 HSBC bank Plc 0.523 0.809 0.647 drs 
2008 Abbey National 0.623 0.999 0.623 drs 
2008 Alliance and Leicester 0.339 0.502 0.675 drs 
2008 Barclays PLC 0.458 0.964 0.475 drs 
2008 The Co-operative Bank Plc 0.429 0.434 0.987 irs 
2008 Bradford and Bingley 0.989 1.000 0.989 irs 
 Mean 0.617 0.796 0.780  
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Table 8.1:  Summary of  DEA- slacks and targets (IBB: model-M4) 
 Output Slacks Input Slacks Output Targets Input Targets 
Year 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 82.490 2.210 8.610 3.250 47.720 
2006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.482 0.000 243.871 6.768 11.580 3.668 82.200 
2007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.453 0.000 350.341 10.876 11.090 4.457 130.980 
2008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.478 31.931 236.056 7.730 10.000 3.982 114.169 
 
 
Table 9:  Summary results of the regression analysis 
The Model- Coefficients and t- statistics 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
ISLAM-dummy _ _ B= -.175 
t= -3.583** 
_ 
Bank‘s size -Log. assets _ B =  .237 
t = 3.558 *** 
B=1.100 
t = 4.414*** 
B=.621 
t = 4.644*** 





t = - 4.009*** 
Bank‘s region B = -.158 
t = -1.708**** 
B = -.473 
t = 3.221*** 
_ _ 
Bank‘s market share _ B = -.276 
t= -3.437** 
B=-1.090 
t = - 4.369*** 
B=-.330 
t = - 2.384* 
Bank‘s loans intensity _ B = .320 
t = 1.755**** 
_ B=.339 
t= 1.842**** 




Bank‘s liquidity _ B=-.514 
t=-4.267*** 
_ _ 






*: significant at the 0.05 level-p<.05 (2-tailed), **: significant at the 0.01 level-p<.01 (2-tailed), 
***: significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) p<0.1%, ****: significant at the 0.10 level-p<.10 (2-tailed) 
Note: For the sake of parsimony, the table displays only the estimated "Beta" and the "t" values. 
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Table 10 
Summary statistics of  the variables employed in the 4 models of DEA 
All numbers are expressed in million £ after deflation. 
Outputs-Inputs N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
M1 
Total Loans 48 0.440 1,567.810 596.770 414.086 
Total Revenues 48 0.580 263.530 69.251 58.834 
Total Expenses 48 3.810 16,768.770 388.629 2,415.026 
Total Staff Cost 48 0.900 698.570 24.998 99.656 
Total Deposits 48 2.700 3,172.440 761.526 598.330 
M2 
Total Loans 40 82.490 22,668.570 4,237.159 5,050.672 
Total Revenues 40 2.210 1823.300 411.548 494.508 
Total Expenses 40 8.61 1005.16 152.464 194.139 
Total Staff Cost 40 3.250 253.120 61.228 57.989 
Total Deposits 40 47.720 19,682.360 4,223.458 4,589.773 
M3 
Total Loans 28 29.400 1,278.720 298.965 354.175 
Total Revenues 28 2.211 38.110 10.927 10.700 
Total Expenses 28 1.510 19.600 7.089 5.446 
Total Staff Cost 28 0.850 10.710 3.494 2.722 
Total Deposits 28 47.720 1,214.390 323.312 348.269 
M4 
Total Loans 56 105.940 644,732.470 20,3774.686 1.730 
Total Revenues 56 2.940 53,775.550 12,522.143 14,615.558 
Total Expenses 56 10.000 39,902.580 7,919.875 10,505.427 
Total Staff Cost 56 4.150 8,027.700 2,109.719 2,234.654 




Correlation matrix between inputs and outputs (M1-M4). 
The Model Revenue T. Expenses T. Staff Cost T Deposits 
M1 
T. Loans 0.767 0.631 0.524 0.799 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.813 0.726 0.753 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.502 0.776 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.545 
M2 
T. Loans 0.896 0.928 0.934 0.854 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.890 0.900 0.798 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.939 0.833 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.827 
M3 
T. Loans 0.799 0.638 0.651 0.845 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.546 0.587 0.971 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.937 0.497 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.533 
M4 
T. Loans 0.920 0.937 0.874 0.959 
T. Revenues 1.000 0.966 0.839 0.881 
T. Expenses  1.000 0.853 0.912 
T. Staff Cost   1.000 0.933 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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* (+) indicates a positive effect, (-) indicates a negative (inverse) effect, while (0) indicates (No) effect. 
** The market share of a bank is measured by dividing the amount of its deposits by the total amount of all sample bank‘s deposits in a 
local market. The sample banks represent the majority of major banks deposits in a banking industry.  
*** The term dependency means: a) Islamic banks managed by conventional banks. b) Banks operate as subsidiary or a member (part) 
of a banking group. Independent banks are "stand alone banks". 
**** In this paper, we introduced (5) dummies to avoid the dummy trap in order to get away from the perfect multi co-linearity.  
However, the number of dummy variables is not important, what matter is whether the sum of any of the dummies is the same for all 
observations.  
***** A core issue in the corporate governance is the nature of the relationship between the level of debt in the bank's capital structure 
and economic performance. Thus, we can measure the relationship between the DEA scores and leverage as a proxy of corporate 




Summary of the exogenous variables used in the second -stage of DEA. 
The measurement and the expected effect on efficiency Exogenous  variables 
Profitability= net income to total assets. (+)*  1BPjt                 (E1,E2) 
Personal expenses as a proxy of skills utilization measured by total amount of wages and salaries to 
total assets. (-): "efficient banks are expected to have lower cost because of IT". 
  2Perjt               (E1,E2) 
Liquid assets to total deposits and short term funding as a proxy of liquid asset ratio. (+ or -)   3Liqjt               (E1,E2) 
The logarithm of total assets as a proxy of size. (+)   4 Log(A)jt        (E1,E2) 
The proxy of lending intensity= total Loans to total asset. (+): loans are the main source of revenue.   5LTAjt              (E1,E2) 
Total deposits as a proxy of banks market share. (+): deposits are considered the main source of banks 
progress. 
  6 Depojt          (E1,E2)** 
The effect of independency. Dummy variable; (1) if a bank is managed by parents (subsidiary), (0) if 
it is stand alone bank. (+ or -) 
  7 Indjt             (E1,E2)*** 
The effect of age and experience. Dummy variable; (1) if <10 years, (0) otherwise. (+)  8 Agejt              ( E1,E2)**** 
Financial leverage= total assets to equity. (-)   9Levjt              (E1,E2)***** 
The percentage change in gross domestic production per capita (favorable economic condition will 
affect positively on demand and supply of banking services). (+ or -) 
 10GDPjt           (E1) 
Diversification effect. Dummy variable; (1) if high diversified, (0) otherwise. (+): Unless it leads to 
higher risk. 
  10Diverjt         (E2) 
Geographical location effect. Dummy variable; (1) if the bank is located in Europe; = (0) otherwise. 
(+): Islamic banks in Muslim countries are more efficient. 
 11Geojt             (E1) 
Dummy variable; (1) if an Islamic bank; = (0) otherwise. (+ or -)  12Islamjt           (E2) 
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Table 13: Overall results from testing the "OLS" main assumptions. 
The Results Of Our Analysis The Test The Assumption 
T >0.20 - Tolerance i.  Non-Multicolinearity 
VIF≤ 4 - Variance –Inflation Factor 
D-W ≈ 2 ( P >0.05*) - Durbin-Watson 
Skew is within the range (+1 to -1)   Skewness ii. Normality** 
Certainly been met   Scatter-Plots iii. Linearity 
 
Model results:  
1.  R
2
 > 56% (M1=56.7%; M2=67.5%; M3=73.9%; and M4=62.8%), this illustrate a strong correlation between the observed value of 
the response variable and the values predicted by the model.
 
M1, F12,35=3.825, P<.01; M2, F11, 28 = 5.297, P<.001; M3, F11, 16=4.128, P<.001;  M4, F10,45=7.608, P<.001 2.  ANOVA*** 
* The p-value tests for serial correlation. Since the p-value is greater than 0.05, then there is no serial correlation and the data are fine. 
** Despite the fact that the multiple regression procedures are not greatly affect by minor deviations from the assumptions of linearity 
and normality of data, and to produce more accurate results, we use the nonlinear transformation to meet the foregoing assumptions. 
***we clearly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the predictors is related to the efficiency scores. This means that 
the models that have been estimated are theoretically construct and statistically significant. 
Additional notes: 
I. In order to get rid the negative values for a variable, we add a constant to move the minimum value of the distribution above 0.  Hence, 
we use log+4 in our analysis to transfer the logarithms results to a positive numbers. Furthermore, for the original data values include 
negative number, it is not possible to apply many nonlinear transformations, in this situation we add a constant to all data values that 
make them positive, as a rule of thumb, we add the smallest constant that will convert the largest negative data value to a value greater 
than1. 
II. It is worth noting that the DEA model requires the input and output data to be non-negative and preferably strictly positive (no zero 
value), therefore, it is necessary to transfer the negative data into positive one. One of the more common methods for eliminating this 
problem has been through the addition of a sufficiently large positive constant to the values of the input or output that has the negative 
number (Ali and Seiford, 1990). 
III. Formally, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than central tendencies. In contrast to regression methods, DEA focuses 
on individual observations and optimizes the performance measure of each unit. A prior knowledge of weights or prices for inputs and 




Summary statistics of the (Mean) values of the independent variables used in the OLS-regression analysis (2005-08) 









IBB (UK) 0.257 0.055 0.406 1.263 0.911 0.245 5.527 
Islamic Banks in Malaysia 0.057 0.004 0.219 0.687 0.403 0.157 13.187 
Islamic Banks in Turkey 0.179 0.020 0.170 0.534 0.730 0.110 9.294 
Islamic Banks in (GCC) Countries 0.258 0.048 0.476 2.842 0.683 0.225 5.790 
MEAN: Islamic Banks* 0.165 0.024 0.289 1.354 0.605 0.164 9.424 
MEAN: Small Islamic Banks * 0.149 0.029 0.347 0.988 0.614 0.237 6.814 
MEAN: Large Islamic Banks  0.323 0.054 0.481 0.721 0.685 0.162 7.783 
Conventional Banks: UK 0.446 0.090 0.459 0.762 0.685 0.109 24.365 
MEAN: Small Conventional Banks 0.889 0.178 0.540 0.949 0.714 0.186 7.877 
MEAN: Large Conventional Banks 0.002 0.002 0.377 0.575 0.655 0.031 40.854** 
* Only from Muslim countries. **this amount means the bank has £40.854 of assets for every £1 of common equity. With leverage of 
40.854, if the value of those assets were to fall, then common stockholders are wiped out. This means the need of more (£) in tangible 
common equity to absorb losses stemming from what is essentially an over-leveraged financial system. 
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" scores by group banks within the sample period* 
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